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CASE NO. 13824 
CITY COURT OF LOGAN CITY, 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
1 —' 
Appellant usually does not comment or feel that it is important to comment 
upon what "public policy" should be, being content to allow the State Legislature to 
indulge in such considerations. However, ih redding the statement and position of the 
Amicus Curiae, we feel that we should allude to misconceptions. First, the majority 
opinion did not hold that prosecutions for "driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor" 
under the Utah Motor Vehicle Code cannot take place in city courts. Second, the Court8s 
decision certainly wi l l not or does not undermine Hie city court system. On the contrary, 
the policy considerations of the city judges would seem to indicate that the city judges 
would like to have exclusive jurisdiction of a l l misdemeanor complaints f i led within the 
- 2 -
counties of the State of Utah, to the detriment of the present justice system. Before 
presenting the Court with a barrage of policy considerations, we suggest that the 
Judges1 Association apply the statutory law contained within the Utah Code applicable 
to the matter before the Court, and learVe the policy considerations to t|ie proper body, 
the State Legislature/
 v,.--•_:,.: - v . . » , ; , ?"V:".'>\:\:] 
A R G U M E N T 
• • • * , , " i ;•;. : . . . . • • . . " ; • ; 
POINT,!
 x A v 
THE AMICUS CURIAE MISCONCEIVES THE HOLDING 
OF THE COURT I N BELIEVING THAT THE DECISION AS IT 
" NOW STANDS DEPRIVES CITY COURTS OF COUNTY-WIDE " 
JURISDICTION. < ; 
The Amicus Curiae states in its brief that policy considerations have 
beenstiessed because the effect of the Court's decision herein is to take away the county-
wide jurisdiction of city courts in "drunk-driving" and "hit-run" cases. Amicus Curiae 
argues further that this Court on occasion has stressed the importance of public policy 
and interpretation of statutes and that where "a literal interpretation of the language of 
the statute gives an absurd result", then the Court will search further for legislative intent. 
While we do not intend to indulge here in public policy considerations, we do, however, 
contend that the Amicus Curiae misunderstands the Court's decision. The policy arguments 
of the Amicus Curiae can be disposed of if the statutes covering jurisdiction of justice 
courts and city courts are carefully analyzed, the statutes were previously analyzed in 
- 3 -
detail in appellant's original brief herein. However, to dispel any arguments concerning 
the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned herein, we feel that they should be 
again re-emphasized. These statutes are: 
{ . } , - . , : ; . ; : A / V - ; . . • • - ' " • • ' • : 
7 8 - 5 - 1 , U . C . A . : "Every justice of the peace shall 
reside in and shall hold a justice's court in the precinct, city 
or town for which he is elected or appointed, provided that 
where two precincts are embraced within limits of any incor-
porated city or town, the justices of the peace of such precincts 
may hold court at any place within such city or town. If after 
reasonable search, the county commissioners are unable to find 
a perspective justice of the peace residing within a precinct 
- needing a justice of the peace, they may select the person 
residing within an adjoining precinct of the county or within the 
city l imits/1 ^ - ^ 
77-57-2, (J. C . A . : . "Other than as provided by Section 
.'.-. . 77-13-17, proceedings and actions before a justice's court for a 
misdemeanor offense must be commenced by complaint under oath, 
setting forth the offense charged with such particulars of time, 
place, person, and property as to enable the defendant to under-
stand distinctly the character of the offense complained of and 
to answer the complaint. The complaint shall be commenced 
before a magistrate within the precinct of the county or city in 
which the offense is alleged to haye been committed." *"• 
v . ; •'• 78-4-16 .5 , U . C . A . ; "Whenever a complaint may be 
commenced before a magistrate under Section 77-57-2, or 
an arrested person is to be taken before a magistrate under 
Section 77-13-17, a complaint may be commenced or the arrested 
person may be taken before the nearest city court judge in 
counties where city courts have been established." 
We note as follows: , « 
• . . " " • • / * • • • • " 
(a) In construing Section 77 -57 -2 , U . C . A . , by its terms, 
it is applicable only to matters commenced by a formal complaint, 
"under oath", and does not cover either the non-warrant arrest under 
77-13-17, U . C * A . , or a non-warrant arrest followed by a ticket 
- 4 -
complaint not nunder oath" under 41-6-166 and 41-6-167 I l 
of the Utah Code, 
(b) Section 78-4 -16 .5 , U . C . A . , by its own terms, 
is limited to Section 77-57-2, U . C . A . {formal complaint) * -
proceedings, and 77-13-17, U . C , A . , (non-warrant arrests) 
under the criminal code proceedings and does not apply to 
non-warrant arrests and ticket complaints under Section 41-6-166 
' . and 41-6-167 of the Utah Traffic Code. 
(c) The Supreme Court Rule on ticket complaint 
• .. proceedings, as set forth in 78-4 -16 .5 , U . C . A . , allows an 
., arresting officer to substitute the nearest city court for the 
:-.,"•• ; nearest magistrate in designated situations only, and does 
not include non-warrant arrests under the Utah Traffic Code 
/ s for driving under the influence of intoxicants or hit -run. 
, * * ' . * . • ' , > . . . . ;- • 
(d) Section 7 8 - 5 - 5 , U . C . A , , gives,town magistrates the 
same powers and jurisdictions as precinct justices in all other 
actions, civil and criminal; it seems abundantly clear that the 
town magistrates under 7 8 - 5 - 5 , U . C . A . , and 78 -5 -4 , U . C . A . , 
have jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses committed within 
the county wherein the magistrate resides. It is also abundantly 
clear that the city court located in the county has jurisdiction 
over such matters under 78-4-16.5 of the Utah Code. 
Indeed, to argue that the ruling of the majority in the case before the Court deprives the 
city court of jurisdiction in a l l state traffic offeinses is without foundation. Moreover, 
the ruling of the Court does not address itself to jurisdiction. Rather, the ruling delineates 
and defines the procedures which must be followed when a peace officer performs an arrest 
involving intoxication and hit-run under the Utah Traffic Code. 
The Amicus Curiae argues that Section 41-6-166, U . C . A . , cannot be 
• • • . • . • • . . . • , ' \ 
- , * » t . • • " ' . - • * . • ' • 
considered in isolation or in a vacuum. An examination of the Utah Traffic Code Sections 
., - 5 - • • • ^ : : - : 
41-6-166 and 41-6-167 r£bdily points up the speciousness of such an argument. 
Section 41-6-167, U . C . A . , is a comprehensive direction to peace officers and magistrates 
when an arrest is made under the traffic qode without warrant. To quote from respondents 
brief, "The purpose of such a statute is fo insure that fhe arrested person is advised of fhe 
charge made against him so fhat he may prepare his defense, to protect him from being 
held without communication and fo prevent secret and,extended interrogation by the 
arresting officers". Further, 41-6-167, U . C . A . , provides that, "Whenever a person is 
immediately taken before a magistrate, as hereinabove provided, (obviously referring fo 
41-6-^166, U . C . A . ) , certain procedures must then be followed."
 y To argue, as does the 
; .. .. ft 
Amicus Curiae, that no further direction is given to, fhe officer or magistrate as to what 
to do when an arrested person is brought before him under the traffic code, pursuant to 
4 I -6-J66, U . C . A . , indicates that the Amicus Curiae has purposely failed to consider the 
remaining statutes contained within the traffic code, particularly 41^6-167, U . C . A . The 
Amicus Curiae argues further that the Court, in rendering its decision, failed fo consider 
Secfion 41-6-169, U . C . A . . Jt argues fhat fhe provisions of 41-6-169, U . C . A . , should 
have an influence on how the Court should construe 78-4-16 .5 , U . C . A . Section 78-4-16.5 
U . C . A . , is limited by its own terms, which are, as we hgve previously stated and now 
reiterate, Section 77-57-2, U . C . A . (formal complainf) proceedings, and Section 77-13-17, 
U . C . A . (non-warrant arrests under the criminal code),, In making its decision, it is 
important fo note that the majority of fhe Courf felt that when an officer performs an arrest 
' - 6 - * 
under the traffic code, (41-6-166, U . C . A . ) , he must comply with the conditions of 
that section• The provisions of 41-6-169, U . C . A . , give the arresting officer an option 
to follow in the event the officer wishes an arrest under local ordinances or some other 
provision of the law. See the opinion of the Court, wherein it is stated, "It is important 
to note that the Complaint; filed against Wells was laid under Title 41 , U . C . A . , 1953, -
The Motor Vehicle Code, - not, under Title 77, having to do generally with magistrate 
procedural and jurisdictional matters regqrd$ misdemeanor^ as offenses." 
The(^micus Curiae argues that ip some way, the pending case of 
Shelmidine, V . Jones, recently decided by the Honorable Stewart iy\„. Har\sonf J r . , of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, has some connection with the matter before the Court. 
Evidently, counsel for the Amicus Curiae construes the opinion of Judge Hanson, J r . , 
to affect the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace to hear a misderr\Qanpr pff^nse within 
Salt Lake County, when, in fact,,the decision of the District Judge affects the power of 
a justice of the peace to impose a sentence following a trial or hearing. There is no 
reference in the opinion of Judge Stewart M . Hanson, J r . , to pr$-trjal procedure. 
Inasmuch as the case before this Court deals with procedures for arrest by a peace officer 
under the Utah Traffic Code, Judge Hanson's decision does not relate to this case. ^Whether 
or not a judge is legally trained has nothing to c|o„with the duties of a peace-officer 
following the legislative mandat^ set forth in Title 41-1-166 of the Motor Vehicle,Code. 
^ ' -
 :
 - 7 - f
 f. ; ;•"•'' 
POINT II ' V V : 
v - THE DECISION OF THE COURT DOES N O T ' 
CREATE C O N F U S I O N , U N C E R A l N T Y , OR ADD A 
< " BURDEN UPON THE COURT OR PEACE OFFICERS 
In rendering its decision, the Court obviously was concerned about 
procedural due process. The case, of course, arose upon a motion based upon a failure 
of the arresting officer to comply with 41-6-166, U . C . A . , which, as the Court stated, 
says in clear concise English that if a person is arretted for driving under the influence 
?* of intoxicating liquors, he shall be taken before the nearest magistrate to fhe place where 
such arrest is made. The Court indicated in its decision fhaf had there been a showing 
that the local magistrate, fhe Wellsville Mqgisfrdfe, was not available, fhen fhe defendant 
could be presented or arraigned before other magistrates, including the Logan City Court. 
The Court intimates that fhe existing statutes are designed to prevent magistrate shopping 
or other injustices. Obyiously, the Court was concerned with the rights of the individual 
defendant and felt fhaf fhe legislature, by enacting fhe Traffic Code Statutes 41-1-166 and 
41-1-167, intended speciaTprocedural considerations for fhe two offenses fherein delineated. 
The argument that practical considerations, such as fhe location of 
precincts of justices and town justices, might work an imposition on the arresting officer 
seems to us to be less important than protecting fhe rights of fhe individual defendant. 
Further, it is difficult to see why if is an imposition on fhe arresting officer to take the 
party to the nearest justice. The irrtposffion might arise if the officer were required to 
- 8 - . 
drive past several magistrates in order to find a city judge. 
The clear articulation by the Court of the mandates of the statutes 
prescribe the procedural due process which must be afforded persons arrested and charged 
under the traffic code. Rather than creating confusion, we submit that the decision gives 
precise direction to the arresting officer, 
CONCLUSION 
The Amicus Curiae obviously is impressed with the importance of a 
trained judiciary. Obviously, a trained judiciary is desirable for the citizens of our 
state. However, this case involves only the procedure of the arrest of the citizen and 
assures him of equal treatment by preventing the officer from either delaying the initial 
confrontation or by being arbitrary in the selection of the place of confrontation. 
The decision of the Court ascribes to the proposition that the rights of the 
individual defendant should be protected, that he should be afforded due process as 
promulgated by the mandatory provisions of the statutes of the State of Utah. The clear 
language of the Motor Vehicle Code should not be ignored; the appellant respectfully 
urges that the respondent's Petition for Rehearing is without substance, does not involve 
public policy and should be denied. c ; v - : 
Respectfully submitted, 
Charles P. Olson, deceased,
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